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Abstract
The success of tech firms rests on their ownership of the algorithms for operating newplatforms for the interactions among
five groups of stakeholders in the markets of news, ads, and chats: stakeholders from the spheres of politics, journalism,
the citizenry, the tech firms themselves, and other firms. Recent regulations that touch on property rights such as the
German Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz and the European Directive on Copyright in the Digital Market have turned owner-
ship of algorithms into exclusive ownership. Thereby tech firms obtain also the right to censor and the exclusive right to
micro-target clients for advertisers. Coase’s theorem is used to discuss alternative allocations of property rights that could
improve the quality of news, ads, and chats.
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1. Introduction
“I’m a lawyer and I have no idea what that means” de-
clared Republican Senator Lindsey Graham while hold-
ing up the Facebook Terms of Service in the Congres-
sional Hearing regarding Facebook on April 10th, 2018
(C-Span, 2018). In spite of such objections, the US Con-
gressional Hearing, the GermanNetzwerkdurchsetzungs-
gesetz (NetzDG)1 of January 2018, the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR)2 of May 2018, and the Direc-
tive on Copyright in the Digital Market (“Copyright Direc-
tive”, approved by the European Parliament in Septem-
ber 2018; expected implementation in laws of the Euro-
pean Union (EU) member states in 2019)3, all push in
the direction of giving even more rights to tech firms:
first, the right to use their algorithms to censor, as well
as the exclusive right to use their algorithms to micro-
target their users with messages from firms and advo-
cacy groups who pay for this.
NetzDG encourages internet platforms to censor.
Fines of up to 5 million euros may be imposed (4.2) if
they do not remove client postings with offending con-
tent. NetzDG may promote advocacy groups to accuse
their political opponents of hate speech, so as to cause
tech firms to block or remove opinionated messages
of their opponents. In the Congressional hearing, Face-
book’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg announced that, by the
end of 2018, 20,000 people will work on content review.
Ultimately more advanced AI algorithms “would block
millions of fake accounts each day at the point of creation
before they do any harm” (Facebook, 2018, p. 110). The
Copyright Directive forces tech firms explicitly to develop
“effective content recognition technologies” which en-
able censorship. These technologies should enable tech
firms to let its users pay for linking to news items from
media companies (11, “link tax”) and to prevent its users
from uploading or disseminating copyrighted materials
(13, “upload filter”). According to a group of the inter-
1 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/netzdg/NetzDG.pdf
2 https://gdpr-info.eu/
3 Copyright Directive proposal 2016: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0593. Amendments European Parliament
September 2018 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2018-0337
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net’s architects, including Vincent Cerf (internet protocol
TCP/IP) and Timothy Berners-Lee (World Wide Web pro-
tocol HTTP), this is “an unprecedented step towards the
transformation of the internet from an open platform
for sharing and innovation, into a tool for the automated
surveillance and control of its users” (Cerf et al., 2018).
An exclusive ownership right given to tech firms to
use their algorithms to micro-target users with third
partymessages swings the pendulumback. In 2013, Face-
book, for example, offered its users the right to use
Facebook’s GraphSearch algorithm to explore the pref-
erences of friends of friends. According to Alexandr Ko-
gan, who used GraphSearch to scrape Facebook user
data for CambridgeAnalytics, scraping was quite com-
mon at that time. The try-out was stopped in December
2014 because of privacy issues and because its usemade
Facebook slow. In 2018, Mark Zuckerberg could easily
state, therefore:
In 2014, to prevent abusive apps, we announced that
we were changing the entire platform to dramatically
limit the data apps could access. Most importantly,
apps like Kogan’s could no longer ask for data about
a person’s friends unless their friends had also autho-
rized the app. (Zuckerberg, 2018)
Future advertisers and campaigners will have to pay the
tech firms to use their graph search algorithms for micro-
targeting. As a result, the tech firms earn the largest
share of advertising revenues, although algorithm own-
ers may decide to let successful vloggers share in adver-
tisement revenues once they attract many new clients
(YouTube), or put advanced social media monitoring
tools such as CrowdTangle at the disposal of media com-
panies so as to maximize the audience for their news
items on their social media pages (Facebook). Thus, tech
firmswho own the search algorithms that link their users
to news content provided by media companies help to
increase the traffic to the websites of these media com-
panies, which enables the latter to sell advertisement
space on their own websites. In advance, media com-
panies did contribute to the traffic towards the search
algorithms of tech firms, and therefore to the adver-
tising revenues of tech firms, with the cumulative sup-
ply of their latest news content. Only a fraction of the
search algorithm users in search of news content click
on the news snippets or news summaries from media
companies that tech firms show to them. Only a fraction
reaches the websites of media companies. This explains
why the advertisement revenues of tech firms went up
disproportionally as compared to those of media com-
panies. This explains also why tech companies are op-
posed to the Copyright Directive that would reward me-
dia companies for the traffic that tech companies can at-
tract by providing links to, or using links to, news con-
tent provided by media companies. According to UK Mu-
sic, Google alone spent more than 30 million euro in its
successful lobby to depict the Copyright Directive as the
end of an open internet with free links to other websites
(UK Music, 2018). Google exploited its ownership of the
Pagerank algorithm by inducing the main German me-
dia companies, who feared the removal of online links
to their news articles on NetzDG copyright grounds, to
undermine NetzDG by entering into zero price licenses
with Google. With $7.4 million in litigation costs against
Google, the German association of media companies
could use NetzDG to let Google pay out €0.7 million to
media companies who were not satisfied with a zero
price license (Ehle, 2018). The legitimacy of media com-
panies in such judicial battles is low because news con-
tent is delivered by journalists, while media tycoon com-
panies appear to want to become tech firms themselves
by investing less in journalism than in online presence
and marketing.
Here we will take Coase’s theorem as the point of de-
parture to answer the research question whether alter-
native allocations to stakeholders of property rights over
algorithms would result in a lower price, or a higher qual-
ity of news, ads, and/or chats.
2. Coase Theorem
Ronald H. Coase (1910–2013) received the 1991 Noble
prize “for his discovery and clarification of the signifi-
cance of transaction costs and property rights for the
institutional structure and functioning of the economy”.
Property rights apply to palpable objects that you are
holding in your hands, but also to land, labor force,
money, assets, debt certificates, futures, patents, radio
frequencies, and network algorithms.
The Coase theorem holds that if property rights are
allocated and protected by a Sovereign, and transaction
costs are independent of who holds the property rights,
then parties will negotiate about the price of benefitting
from the use of such property. They will agree on the
same price, regardless of who holds the property rights—
what differs is merely who has to pay the price (Coase,
1960/2013). A classic “reciprocal” example is that river
delta inhabitants who want to prevent the pollution of
the river will be ready to pay the same price to mountain
inhabitants who own the river, as the price that moun-
tain inhabitants are ready to pay to dump their polluted
waste in the river owned by the river delta inhabitants.
Coase developed his theorem in the context of his
investigations into the lack of explicit ownership over
radio frequencies in the first half of the previous cen-
tury (Coase, 1959/2013). To be able to develop a judi-
cial framework to settle disputes about the interference
of different radio signals, the government should use its
sovereignty to allocate property rights, just as Thomas
Hobbes’ Sovereign (Hobbes, 1660/2002). This could be
achieved by having auctions to sell radio frequencies to
the highest bidder. Without property rights, the legal sys-
tem would keep producing inconsistent jurisdiction as
to whether government agencies had any discretion to
refuse a radio license, and whether refusing a radio li-
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cense was a violation of the constitutional freedom of
the press.
Just as radio programs relate to radio frequencies
which allow the targeting of citizens and firms within a
geographical area, so do chats, ads, news, and data relate
to algorithms which allow for the micro-targeting of spe-
cific firms or citizens. The claim of this article is that, just
as disputes over the constitutional freedom of the press
were solved by government regulations to establish own-
ership of radio frequencies, disputes over the freedomof
expression versus surveillance, censorship, and control
can be solved in part by new government regulation re-
garding property rights over network algorithms.
The Coase theorem urges us to ask which stakehold-
ers are involved, whether property rights are sufficiently
clear and whether transaction costs sufficiently low to
negotiate a deal.
3. Stakeholders to Whom Property Rights Could
Be Allocated
Tech firms own network algorithms. Basically, a network
algorithm relies on relationships R between concepts X
and Y, that could be modeled as RDF-triplets. It derives
“transitive” logical conclusions, for example whether X
will presumably like Z based on information about the re-
lationship of X to Y, and of Y to Z, e.g., conclusions about
a book Z that Xmay want to read, given the resemblance
between book Z and a book Y that was already bought
by X. The network algorithm that underlies the right-
hand side of Google pages, for example, often offers a
better comparison of industries and products than web
pages of individual organizations filled with PR clichés.
To think about possible alternative allocations of
property rights over network algorithms in the market
of news, advertisements, and chats, Figure 1 shows a
simplified model with five groups of stakeholders from
the spheres of the network algorithm firms themselves,
other firms, politics, journalism, and the citizenry.
Within a fewdecades, network algorithm firms—e.g.,
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Yahoo Finance, Bloomberg,
Thomson Reuters’ Datastream, and RELX’s LexisNexis—
became “semi-benevolent information monopolies”
(Karpf, 2018) which established new relations with the
other four types of actors. More importantly, they also
afforded new relations between the latter. To relate Fig-
ure 1 above to its explanation below, italics will be used
for the newly afforded relationships between the stake-
holders that are printed as arrow labels in Figure 1.
Tech firms offer the platforms, data, and informa-
tion, onwhich firms, financial markets, citizens and politi-
cians rely. They deliver citizens a new platform to chat
with other citizens, sometimes in their roles as voters
or consumers. They allow firms, both in the B2B- and
chat
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news
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Figure 1. Reciprocal relations between network algorithm stakeholders in the market of news, ads, and chats.
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B2C-markets, to micro-target consumers with ads. Their
social media algorithms offer parties, advocacy groups,
and government agencies ameans tomobilize citizens to
participate, share, contribute or vote. Tweets and Face-
book posts from politicians have become a new political
information subsidy (Cook, 1998) to journalism, in com-
bination with the social media metrics to guess their im-
pact. It is a weird symbiotic relationship, in which attack
tweets especially, among others on media and journal-
ists, increase likes and retweets (Lee & Xu, 2018). The
resulting social media storm is often a basis for news in
classic media, even when the tweets were not initially
deemed newsworthy (Wells et al., 2016).
Social media have become a major portal to access
news items from classic media, although online surveys
somewhat overestimate their use (Newman, Fletcher,
Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018). The news sup-
ply of classic media is split into separate news items
with a standard format whose clickbait is routinely as-
sessed with A/B tests. Relatively slow news in classic me-
dia about political and financial networks nevertheless
exerts not only an influence on public support for polit-
ical candidates (Wells et al., 2016), but also a long-term
influence on financial markets (Kleinnijenhuis, Schultz,
Oegema, & van Atteveldt, 2013; Kräussl & Mirgorod-
skaya, 2017). The relevance and influence of news is not
captured in price information in the way that modernists
like Smith (“the invisible hand”) and Karl Marx (“hinter
dem Rücken der Produzenten”) predicted. Classic media
are still the major source of online news (Thurman &
Schifferes, 2012), but their advertising revenues are de-
creasing because the advertising revenues of the tech
firms who disseminate their news are increasing.
4. Price and Quality of News, Ads, and Chats After
Alternative Allocations of Algorithm Ownership
The puzzle to solve is whether an alternative allocation
of algorithm ownership would result in a lower price, or
a higher quality, of news, ads, and chats.
A re-allocation that simply would not work is to
split giant tech firms into parts. The parts would have a
strong incentive to cooperate to serve advertisers with
potential customers everywhere and to serve users with
friends everywhere. Prices would remain largely unal-
tered, in line with the Coase theorem. A functional split,
similar to the split in the banking sector between invest-
ment banks and consumer banks, would not work either,
because there is no business model for news or chats
without ads, and no model of democracy based on qual-
ity news without chats and debate.
The European GDPR grants internet users ownership
over their personal data, without providing them with an
efficient means to sell it. Therefore, they have to deliver
them for freeby clicking a thousand times that they accept
all cookies before they can carry out business as usual.
More radical ways to split up property rights may not
work either because transaction costs, which are primar-
ily energy costs in the case of the internet, would be
much higher. The enormous energy costs of the current
internet are negligible when compared to an internet in
which unsupervised high-frequency crypted transactions
between all users would be required (i.e., blockchain
technology) and in which moreover blocking or remov-
ing of specific content would be both content specific
(e.g., censorship, copyright) and user specific (e.g., var-
ious ratings of social credit). For the same reason, incred-
ibly high transaction costs would result if property rights
of graph search algorithms were granted to firms, jour-
nalists, and political agencies so that individual internet
users would have to pay time and again to avoid being
micro-targeted. High transaction costs that threaten the
internet will result also if EU member states would make
a mess out of property rights by implementing the link
tax and the upload filter from the Copyright Directive am-
biguously or inconsistently so thatmany different parties
in EUmember states may go to court to claim on very dif-
ferent grounds that tech companies violated their prop-
erty rights over news items, texts, music, films, video
clips, art, patents, intellectual property, or art.
Re-allocating the ownership of a part of the network
algorithms invented by tech firms to stakeholders from
the spheres of journalism, politics, firms and the citi-
zenry could however prevent that tech firms obtain a
right to censorship, and even an obligation to censor-
ship, like in NetzDG, GDPR and the Copyright Directive.
It’s too optimistic to assume that censorship by tech
firms would always reckon with old heuristics like “facts
are sacred, comments are free” or with the detached
ways in which the press quotes or paraphrases subjec-
tive sources (Baden & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2018; Van
Atteveldt, Sheafer, Shenhav, & Fogel-Dror, 2017). A re-
allocation of property rights over algorithms should al-
low stakeholders to bring their cases to court, and should
allow judges to make consistent judgements based on
vested property rights. “The legislation must refer to the
algorithm” (Lodder & Loui, in press). It should be noted
that legislation to oblige property owners to give others
full access to their records is by no means a new phe-
nomenon. For example, farmers who own land and live-
stock are obliged by law to give full access to their milk
production, manure disposal and use of pesticides. To re-
move the sting from the Copyright Directive ”upload fil-
ter” (13), it would be helpful to oblige tech firms to equip
firms and citizens like authors and artists with the owner-
ship over advanced monitoring tools to inspect whether
their copyright is violated. New fast-track procedures
would enable firms, authors and artists to go to court,
and would enable judges to shape judicial precedents by
commanding tech firms to remove the links to materials
with specific features in terms of copyright. This digital
copyright should not apply to everything, for example
not to news content to which the “link tax” applies, and
not to materials whose “linkability”, thus whose online
availability, occurred with the privity of the artist. To re-
move the sting from the ”link tax” (11), it would be help-
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ful to oblige tech firms to equip media companies with
the ownership over advanced monitoring tools to regis-
ter, first, the amount of search queries by internet users
that resulted in prominent links to news content deliv-
ered by media companies, next to verify that tech firms
did not promote news content from media companies
who undermine the link tax by not collecting it, and to
verify that the link tax is paid directly to the editorial staff
of a medium website rather than to the media compa-
nies of media tycoons. The link tax should apply only to
tech firms with a businessmodel to raise advertisements
by attracting users who search for news content, and not,
for example to Wikipedia, researchers, teachers or inter-
ested citizens. Splitting up the property rights over algo-
rithms of the “semi-benevolent informationmonopolies”
(Karpf, 2018) may reduce automated surveillance and
control, and increase the quality of news, ads, and chats.
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